Sweep Your Own Floor First

Introduction

The recent proposal advocating for a regional integrity commission for the British Overseas Territories, to be headquartered in Miami, deserves a serious response because it raises concerns far beyond administrative convenience. It touches directly on how the people of the Overseas Territories continue to be viewed by some external commentators: as if our institutions remain incapable of managing our own affairs without supervision from abroad.

That mindset is deeply troubling. No serious person would deny that corruption exists or that accountability mechanisms are necessary. Corruption is a global issue, not one confined to small territories. The United Kingdom itself continues to face its own governance controversies, ethical breaches, and questions surrounding public accountability. Yet despite this, there is no suggestion that Britain should relocate parts of its own oversight structures outside its borders to avoid “the prying eyes and ears” of its communities.

Therefore, the recommendation that a regional integrity body be placed in Miami is not simply impractical, it is insulting.

Why set up an office in Miami?

To argue that oversight should take place outside the territories because our communities are too small, too familiar, or too exposed suggests that our societies are somehow inherently incapable of professionalism, discretion, or constitutional maturity. It sends the message that trust cannot exist within our own institutions and that meaningful accountability must always be imported from elsewhere.

If integrity and transparency are truly the objective, then accountability institutions must be rooted in the jurisdictions they are meant to serve. They must understand the constitutional frameworks, legal traditions, political culture, and social realities of the people affected by their work. Effective oversight cannot be detached from the communities it serves without weakening public confidence and local ownership.

Establishing such a body in Florida would create distance where proximity is needed most. It would add bureaucracy, increase cost, and reinforce the perception that governance in the Overseas Territories is still viewed through an external lens rather than through partnership and institutional respect.

Ironically, we already have reporting mechanisms linked to Florida, including Crime Stoppers, and public engagement with those systems has been limited. Geography does not ensure public trust or effectiveness.

Recent developments also make this proposal particularly difficult to ignore. For the first time, an accountant from outside the Turks and Caicos Islands has been appointed to serve on the Integrity Commission Board, and now we are presented with suggestions that even broader accountability structures should sit outside the territory altogether. Whether intended or not, many will reasonably ask whether these decisions reflect a growing lack of confidence in local professionals and institutions. That perception matters.

Staff of the Commission

It is also important to note that the Integrity Commission itself is already staffed largely by non-Turks and Caicos Islanders. Therefore, the argument that local familiarity somehow compromises impartiality does not withstand close examination. If external staffing already exists within the current framework, then the issue clearly is not local interference but rather a deeper assumption that the territories themselves remain suspect and that is where many people understandably take offence.

Conclusion

During any investigation, regardless of where an office is based, success still depends on local cooperation, community knowledge, and public confidence. The same “eyes and ears” that are being portrayed as problematic are often essential in exposing wrongdoing and ensuring facts emerge. To dismiss small communities as obstacles to integrity is to misunderstand how accountability often works in practice.

Furthermore, The Turks and Caicos Islands have already lived through one of the most painful governance chapters in our history through the SIPT investigations. That experience came at enormous political, institutional, and reputational cost. It taught hard lessons to elected leaders, investors, public officers, and citizens alike.  No one here wants a repeat of that period. To imply that inward investment depends on external reassurance that ministers will not need to be “paid off” is unfair, outdated, and offensive to a country that has spent years strengthening its systems.

Those suggesting external governance solutions should consider their own system’s challenges first.  Sometimes the first act of integrity is simple: Sweep your own floor first.